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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
R. P. Gremel*
Use of Blood Grouping Test Results as Conclusive Evidence-In Commnon-
wealth v. Statti, 73 A. (2d) 688 (Pa., 1950), the defendant was charged
with rape. It appeared from the evidence that he had dragged his victim
into his automobile, and in the course of the struggle, she had bitten his
finger, causing it to bleed. The victim also bled from lacerations caused
when her assailant ripped her mouth. The defendant was apprehended
upon identification of both himself and his automobile by the prosecuting
witness. Samples of the defendant's blood were taken for classification and
comparison with blood stains on his jacket. The examination showed that
the defendant's blood belonged to Group 0 (approximately 45% of the
population shares this grouping), and the victim's blood to Group A. These
facts were admitted in evidence along with testimony to the faet that
stains on the victim's jacket were of type 0, the same as the defendant's.
In instructing the jury as to the weight of this evidence the trial court
carefully pointed out that while such evidence might be conclusive in
establishing the fact of exclusion (that is, where incriminating blood stains
were of a type different from defendant's grouping), such evidence could
not be considered to be conclusive where the types matched, as here, but
is "merely a circumstance" in corroboration of the victim's testimony. On
appeal of the case two questions were presented: first, the usual argument
of self-incrimination, and second, the admissibility of the blood group tests
as evidence.
In deciding that the privilege against self-incrimination was primarily
concerned with testimonial complusion the Pennsylvania court adopted the
prevailing view on the subject. (See Vol. 39, page 533 of this Journal, Vol.
40, page 629r.) Despite a vigorous dissent which objected to taking the de-
fendant's blood against his will, the court was unable to find any appreciable
difference between requiring a defendant to have his fingerprints taken and
submitting to a blood test. Nor did the court feel that the results of the
blood test should have been inadmissible because it was a person other than
the accused who testified to the results.
Regarding the general admissibility of the results of blood grouping
tests as evidence the court found them to be "properly admitted as a cir-
cumstance bearing on the identification of the defendant, in corroboration
of the testimony of the prosecuting witness that he was her assailant." In
answer to the defendant's claim that Type 0 blood is common to about 45%
of the world's population, the court stated that this fact did not destroy the
entire probative value of the test, which was still competent "as some evidence,
just as evidence of how an assailant was dressed, however conventionally,
would be competent though by no means conclusive of identity." (See Vol.
39, pages 126, 128, 273, 418 and 546 of the Journal for additional data on
blood grouping tests, and as regards the self-incrimination issue in this
type of case, as well as the probative value of blood groups similarity, see
Inbau,. Self-Incrimination (1950) 83-87.)
Misdemeanor Must Be Committed in Presence of Officers to Permit Incidental
Search Without Warrant-In Turner v. State, 73 A. (2d) 472 (Md., 1950),
two police officers, while on duty, observed a number of people milling
around the entrance to a building. Some of this group were drinking beer
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and several seemed intoxicated. Feeling impelled to investigate, the officers
entered the building and found the main floor filled with people drinking beer.
They also discovered two slot machines in the center of the room. The officers
seized some of the beer and both of the slot machines and this evidence was
used against the proprietor in a prosecution for selling beer without a license
and operating a gambling device. The defendant appealed on the grounds
that this evidence was secured without a search warrant and was, therefore,
inadmissible. In reversing the judgment the Court of Appeals of Maryland
noted that where a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the arresting
officer he has the right to search the person arrested as well as the immediate
premises for any evidence or "instruments of the crime," but here the
officers had no knowledge that a crime was being committed in the building
until after they were inside and discovered the actual sale of beer and the
slot machines. There had been no disturbance which amounted to a breach
of the peace. Noting that if such a search and seizure were held lawful
there would be nothing to stop officers from entering any dwelling where
people were seen drinking beer, the court concluded that it was of the
opinion that "the search and seizure in this case, made without a search
warrant or other warrant not for the purpose of making an arrest, and no
offense being committed in the presence and view of the officers, was unlawful
and the evidence procured thereby was not admissible." (The rules of search
and seizure have been exceedingly unsettled in recent years, particularly in
the federal courts. See this Journal: Vol. 38, pp. 239, 244; Vol. 39, pp. 208,
354, 420, 693; Vol. 40, pp. 254, 393, 535, 770, 818, 819; for the most recent
Supreme Court decision see page 325 of this issue.)
Indirect Admission of the Results of Lie-Detector Test Denied-The question
as to the admissibility of the results of a lie-detector test reappeared recently
in the case of People v. Wochnick, 219 P. (2d) 70 (Cal., 1950). The defendant
had submitted to the test and admitted to the officer operating the machine
that he was unable to explain the violent reaction which appeared on the
graph of the machine when he was shown the murder instrument and asked
if he had seen it before. The officer who had given the test took the stand
on behalf of the state and testified to the conversation between himself and
the defendant and the latter's inability to explain the results of the test.
The defendant claimed on appeal from his conviction that by the use of
the officer's testimony the state was able to place in evidence the damaging
results of the lie-detector test. The state, on the other hand, argued that
the results of the test were not placed in evidence, claiming that the witness
testified merely to an accusatory statement made by the defendant. The state
further pointed out that the trial court gave specific instructions to the
jury not to consider as evidence any portion of the testimony given which
related to the results of the lie-detector test.
In reversing the case, the California appellate court adopted the prevailing
view that the lie-detector has not yet gained sufficient scientific recognition
to warrant the acceptance of the results of such tests as evidence. Such
direct evidence being inadmissible, the court refused to let the results of the
test be admitted indirectly, stating that "Despite the instruction of the
court, the evidence of the partial results of the lie detector test with respect
to defendant's reaction upon being shown the murder weapon was indelibly
implanted in the minds of the jurors and could not but have had a prejudicial
effect." (For a discussion of the admissibility of lie-detector results in




Confession Secured Prior to Preliminary Hearing Held Admissible-The
question of the lawfulness of a confession secured from a defendant prior
to the holding of a hearing arose again in Commonwealth v. Agoston, 72
A. (2d) 575 (Pa., 1950). There the defendant had been arrested at 2:30 P.M.
on December 17th and examined, with intermittent rest periods, until late
the next evening when the confession was made. According to statements
made to friends at the conclusion of the examination he had been well treated
throughout the period of interrogation. Evidence showed that he had declined
offer of counsel. On the fourth day after the arrest a preliminary hearing
was held. On the basis of the confession and corroborative evidence he was
brought to trial. There he claimed that the confession was secured through
coercive methods on the part of the police and had been made before he had
been supplied counsel. After conviction the defendant appealed. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in affirming the judgment below, stated:
"In judging the admissibility of confessions these facts and principles must
be taken as established: (1) The fact that the confessor is in custody and
has no counsel does not invalidate a confession made by him. (2) The fact
that the interrogation of a suspect continues until he confesses is not
per se a ground for invalidating his confession, nor is the fact that the
interrogation lasted for a considerable period of time any ground for
invalidating the confession, unless the interrogation was so long in dura-
tion as to amount to mental or physical coercion and duress." The court
then added: "A long interrogation is not per se fundamentally unfair. If
officers of the law are to be denied the privilege of interrogating with rea-
sonable persistence persons suspected of committing crimes and, instead of
doing so, are to 'close the books on the crime and forget it, with the
suspect at large' [quoting from Justice Jackson's dissent in Turner v.
State, 338 U. S. 58, 69 S. Ct. 1357] the already vast number of unsolved
crimes in this country will be greatly increased." (For further discussion
on the question of the admissibility of confessions see Vol. 40 of this
Journal at pages 113, 211, and 255.)
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